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ABSTRACT
Deep learning has achieved overwhelming success, spanning from
discriminative models to generative models. In particular, deep
generative models have facilitated a new level of performance in
a myriad of areas, ranging from media manipulation to sanitized
dataset generation. Despite the great success, the potential risks of
privacy breach caused by generative models have not been analyzed
systematically. In this paper, we focus on membership inference at-
tack against deep generative models that reveals information about
the training data used for victim models. Specifically, we present
the first taxonomy of membership inference attacks, encompassing
not only existing attacks but also our novel ones. In addition, we
propose the first generic attack model that can be instantiated in a
large range of settings and is applicable to various kinds of deep
generative models. Moreover, we provide a theoretically grounded
attack calibration technique, which consistently boosts the attack
performance in all cases, across different attack settings, data modal-
ities, and training configurations. We complement the systematic
analysis of attack performance by a comprehensive experimental
study, that investigates the effectiveness of various attacks w.r.t.
model type and training configurations, over three diverse applica-
tion scenarios (i.e., images, medical data, and location data).1
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1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, two categories of deep learning techniques
have made tremendous progress. The discriminative model has
been successfully adopted in various prediction tasks, such as im-
age classification [26, 42, 61, 62] and speech recognition [21, 30].
The generative model, on the other hand, has also gained increas-
ing attention and has delivered appealing applications including
photorealistic image synthesis [20, 44, 52, 70], text and sound gener-
ation [4, 49, 64, 65], sanitized dataset generation [2, 7, 35, 66, 73], etc.
Most of such applications are supported by deep generative models,
e.g., the generative adversarial networks (GANs) [3, 10, 20, 23, 36–
38, 54, 59, 71] and variational autoencoder (VAE) [41, 55, 67].
In line with the growing trend of deep learning in real busi-
ness, many companies collect and process customer data which
is then used to develop deep learning models for commercial use.
However, data privacy violations frequently happened due to data
misuse with an inappropriate legal basis, e.g., the misuse of Na-
tional Health Service data in the DeepMind project.2 Data privacy
can also be challenged by malicious users who intend to infer the
original training data. The resulting privacy breach would raise
serious issues as training data contains sensitive attributes such as
diagnosis and income. One such attack is membership inference
attack (MIA) [5, 18, 24, 25, 58, 60] which aims to identify if a data
record was used to train a machine learning model. Overfitting is
the major cause for the feasibility of MIA, as the learned model
tends to memorize training inputs and perform better on them.
While numerous literature is dedicated to MIA against discrimi-
native models [33, 45, 48, 50, 58, 60, 68], the attack on generative
models has not received equal attention, despite its practical impor-
tance. For instance, GANs have been applied to health record data
and medical images [12, 19, 69] whose membership is sensitive as
it may reveal a patient’s disease history. Moreover, recent works
in privacy preserving data sharing [2, 7, 11, 35, 66, 73] propose to
impose (membership) privacy constraints during GANs training for
sanitized data generation. Understanding the membership privacy
leakage under a practical threat model helps shed light on future
research in this area.
Nevertheless, this is a highly challenging task from the adversary
side. Unlike discriminative models, the victim generative models
2 https://news.sky.com/story/google-received-1-6-million-nhs-patients-data-
on-an-inappropriate-legal-basis-10879142
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do not directly provide confidence values about the overfitting of
data records, and thus leave little clues for conducting membership
inference. In addition, current GAN models inevitably underrepre-
sent certain data samples, i.e., encounter mode dropping and mode
collapse, which pose additional difficulty to the attacker.
Unfortunately, none of the existing works [25, 29] provides a
generic attack applicable to varying types of generative models. Nor
do they report a complete and practical analysis of MIA against deep
generativemodels. For example, Hayes et al. [25] do not consider the
realistic situation where the GAN’s discriminator is not accessible
but only the generator is released. Hilprecht et al. [29] investigate
only on small-scale image datasets and do not involve white-box
attack against GANs. This motivates our contributions towards a
simple and generic approach as well as a more systematic analysis.
In general, we make the following contributions in the paper.
Taxonomy of Membership Inference Attacks against Deep
Generative Models:We conduct a pioneering study to categorize
attack settings against deep generative models. Given the increas-
ing order of the amount of knowledge about a victim model, the
settings are benchmarked as (1) full black-box generator, (2) partial
black-box generator, (3) white-box generator, and (4) accessible dis-
criminator (full model). In particular, two of the settings, the partial
black-box and white-box settings, are of practical value but have
not been explored by previous works. We then establish the first
taxonomy that comprises the existing and our proposed attacks.
See Section 4, Table 1, and Figure 1 for details.
GenericAttackModel and itsNovel InstantiatedVariants:We
propose a simple and generic attack model (Section 5.1) applica-
ble to all the practical settings and various types of deep gener-
ative models. More specifically, our generic attack model can be
instantiated to a preliminary low-skill attack for the full black-box
setting (Section 5.2), a novel black-box optimization-based attack
variant in the partial black-box (Section 5.3), as well as a novel
quasi-Newton optimization-based variant in the white-box settings
(Section 5.4). The consistent effectiveness of our attack model ex-
hibited in all of the aforementioned settings bridges the assumption
gap and performance gap between the full black-box attacks and
discriminator-accessible attack in previous study [25, 29] through
a complete performance spectrum (Section 6.7).
Novel Attack Calibration Technique: To further improve the
effectiveness of our attack model, we adjust our approach to each
query sample and propose our novel attack calibration technique,
which is naturally incorporated in our generic attack framework.
Moreover, we prove its near-optimality under a Bayesian perspec-
tive. Through extensive experiments, we validate that our attack
calibration technique boosts the attack performance noticeably in
all cases, across different attack settings, data modalities, and train-
ing configurations. See Section 5.6 for detailed explanation and
Section 6.6 for experiment results.
Systematic Analysis in Each Setting:We progressively investi-
gate attacks in each setting in the increasing order of amount of
knowledge to adversary. See Section 6.3 to Section 6.5 for detailed
elaboration. In each setting, our research spans several orthogo-
nal dimensions including three datasets with diverse modalities
(Section 6.1), five victim GAN models that were the state-of-the-art
at their release time (Section 6.1), two analysis study w.r.t. GAN
training configuration (Section 6.2), attack performance gains in-
troduced by attack calibration (Section 5.6 and Section 6.6) and
differential private defense (Section 6.8).
2 RELATEDWORK
Generative Models: Generative models are designed for approxi-
mating the probability distribution of the real data. In general, this
is done by defining a parametric family of densities and finding
the optimal parameters that either maximize the real data likeli-
hood or minimize the divergence between generated and real data
distribution. Recent generative models exploit the representation
power of deep neural networks for constituting an exceptionally
rich parametric family, resulting in tremendous success in modeling
high-dimensional data distribution. In this work, we investigate
the most widely used deep generative models, namely the genera-
tive adversarial networks (GANs) [3, 10, 20, 23, 36–38, 54, 59, 71]
and variational autoencoders (VAEs) [13, 14, 40]. Briefly speaking,
GANs are trained to minimize the divergence between the gener-
ated and real data distribution, while VAEs maximize a lower bound
of the real data log-likelihood.
Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs): Shokri et al. [60] spec-
ifies the first MIA against discriminative models in the black-box
setting, where an attack has access to the victim model’s full re-
sponse (i.e., confidence scores for all classes) for a given input query.
They propose to train shadow models that imitate the behavior of
the victim model, which generates data to train an attacker model.
Hayes et al. [25] consider MIA against GANs and also propose to
retrain a shadow model of the victim model in the black-box case.
They then check the discriminator’s output scores to query inputs
and set a threshold such that all the query inputs with scores larger
than the threshold will be classified as in the training set.
Another concurrent study by Hilprecht et al. [29] investigates
MIA against both GANs and VAEs. For VAEs, they assume the
accessibility of the full model and propose to threshold the L2
reconstruction error; For GANs, they only consider the full black-
box setting. Their black-box attack is similar to ours in spirit, as
they count the number of generated samples that are inside an
ϵ-ball of the query, while we exploit the reconstruction distance
instead.
Differential Privacy (DP): Differential privacy [17] is designed
to protect the membership privacy of individual samples and is
by constructing a defense mechanism against MIA. Recent works
propose to train GANmodels with differential privacy constraint [2,
7, 11, 35, 66, 73] and publicize the DP-trained models instead of
the raw data, which allows sharing sensitive data while preserving
privacy. The differential privacy constraint is fulfilled by replacing
the regular stochastic gradient descent with differential private
stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) [1], which injects calibrated
noise in training gradients. As a result, it perturbs data-related
objective functions and mitigates inference attacks.
3 BACKGROUND
3.1 Generative Model
GenerativeAdversarial Networks (GANs):GANs consist of two
neural network modules, a generator G and a discriminator D,
which are trained simultaneously in an adversarial manner. The
generator takes random noise z (latent code) as input and generates
samples that approximate the training data distribution, while the
discriminator receives samples from both the generator and train-
ing dataset and is trained to differentiate the two sources. During
training, these two modules compete and evolve, such that the gen-
erator learns to generate more and more realistic samples aiming
at fooling the discriminator, while the discriminator learns to tell
the two sources apart more accurately. The training objective can
be formulated as
min
θG
max
θD
Ex∼Pdata [log(DθD (x))] + Ez∼Pz [log(1 − DθD (GθG (z)))]
where θG ,θD denote the parameters of the generator and the dis-
criminator. Pdata is the real data distribution, while the Pz is the
prior distribution of the latent code. The first term in the objec-
tive forces the discriminator to output high score given real data
sample. The second term makes discriminator output low score on
generated samples, while the generator is trained to maximize the
discriminator output score. Once the training is done, the discrimi-
nator is no longer useful and will normally be discarded. The gener-
ator will receive new latent code samples z drawn from the known
prior distribution (normally Gaussian) and output the synthetic
data samples, which will be collected and used for the downstream
task.
Variational Autoencoder (VAE):VAE is another widely used gen-
erative framework [41, 55, 67] consists of an encoder and a decoder,
which are cascaded to reconstruct data with pre-defined similarity
metrics, e.g. L1/L2 loss. The encoder maps data into a latent space,
while the decoder maps the encoded latent representation back to
the data space. The VAE objective is composed of the reconstruction
error and the prior regularization over the latent code distribution.
Formally,
min
θ,ϕ
−Eqϕ (z |x )[pθ (x |z)] + KL(qϕ (z |x)∥Pz )
where z denotes the latent code, x denotes the input data, qϕ (z |x)
is the probabilistic encoder parameterized by ϕ which is introduced
to approximate the intractable true posterior, pθ (x |z) represents
the probabilistic decoder parameterized by θ , and KL(·∥·) denotes
the KL divergence. In practice, qϕ (z |x) is always constrained to be
uni-modal Gaussian and z is sampled via the reparameterization
trick, which results in a closed-form derivation of the second term.
Hybrid Model: GANs often suffer from mode collapse and mode
dropping issues, i.e., failing to generate appearances relevant to
some training samples (low recall), due to the lack of explicit super-
vison (e.g. data reconstruction) for promoting data mode coverage.
VAEs, on the contrary, attain better data coverage but often lack
flexible generation capability (low precision). Therefore, a hybrid
model, VAEGAN [8, 43], is proposed to jointly train a VAE and a
GAN, where the VAE decoder and the GAN generator are collapsed
into one by sharing trainable parameters. The GAN discriminator
is trained to complement the low-level L1 or L2 reconstruction loss,
in order to improve the generation quality of fine-grained details.
3.2 Membership Inference
We formulate the membership inference attack as a binary classifi-
cation task where the attacker aims to classify whether a sample
Latent Gen- Dis-
code erator criminator
[25] full black-box × ■ ×
[29] full black-box × ■ ×
Our full black-box (Section 5.2) × ■ ×
Our partial black-box (Section 5.3) ✓ ■ ×
Our white-box (Section 5.4) ✓ □ ×
[25] accessible discriminator (full model) ✓ □ ✓
Table 1: Taxonomy of attack settings against GANs over the
previous work and ours. (×: without access; ✓: with access;
■: black-box; □: white-box).
z Gen samples
Dis
real data
 (1) Full black-box generator
 (2) Par tial black-box generator
 (3) White-box generator
 (4) Accessible discr iminator
real/fake?
Figure 1: Taxonomy of attack models against GANs. Gen:
generator; Dis: discriminator; z: latent code input to Gen.
x has been used to train a victim generative model. Formally, we
define
A : (x ,M(θ )) → {0, 1}
where the attack model A output 1 if the attacker infers that the
query sample x is included in the training set, and 0 otherwise.
θ denotes the victim model parameters while M represents the
general model publishing mechanism, i.e., type of access available
to the attacker. For example, the M is an identity function for
the white-box access case and can be the inference function for
the black-box case. For simplicity, we may omit the dependence
on M if the type of access is irrelevant for illustration. With a
Bayesian perspective [57], the optimal attacker aims to compute
the probability P(x ∈ Dtrain |x ,θ ) and predict the query sample to
be in the training set if the log-likelihood ratio is non-negative, i.e.
the query sample is more likely to be contained in the training set
than not. Mathematically,
A(x ,M(θ )) = 1
[
log P(x ∈ Dtrain |x ,θ )
P(x < Dtrain |x ,θ ) ≥ 0
]
(1)
where 1(·) is the indicator function, and the training set is denoted
by Dtrain. We denote the query sample set as S = {(xi ,mi )}Ni=1
that contains both training set samples (xi ∈ Dtrain,mi = 1) as
well as hold-out set samples (xi < Dtrain,mi = 0), wherem is the
membership indicator variable. The true positive and true negative
rate of the attacker can bemeasure byExi [P(A(xi ,M(θ )) = 1|mi =
1)] and Exi [P(A(xi ,M(θ )) = 0|mi = 0)], respectively.
4 TAXONOMY
The attack scenarios can be categorized into either white-box or
black-box one. In the white-box setting, the adversary has access
to the victim model internals, whereas in the black-box setting,
the internal workings are unknown to the attackers. For attacks
against GANs, we further distinguish the settings based on the
accessibility of GANs’ components, i.e., the latent code, generator
model, and the discriminator model, according to the following
criteria: (1) whether the discriminator is accessible, (2) whether the
generator is accessible, and (3) whether the latent code is accessible.
We elaborate on each category in the following in a decreasing
order of the amount of knowledge to attackers. Note that we define
the taxonomy in a fully attack-agnostic way, i.e. the attacker can
freely decide which part of the available information to use.
4.1 Accessible Discriminator (Full Model)
By construction, the discriminator is only used for the adversarial
training and normally will be discarded after the training stage is
completed. The only scenario in which the discriminator is accessi-
ble to the attacker is that the developers publish the whole GAN
model along with the source code and allow fine-tuning. In this
case, both the discriminator and the generator are accessible to the
adversary in a white-box manner. This is the most knowledgeable
setting for attackers. And the existing attack methods against dis-
criminative models [60] can be applied to this setting. This setting
is also considered in [25], corresponding to the last row in Table 1.
In practice, however, the discriminator of a well-trained GAN is
discarded without being deployed to APIs, and thus not accessible
to attackers. We, therefore, devote less effort to investigating the dis-
criminator and mainly focus on the following practical and generic
settings where the attackers only have access to the generator.
4.2 White-box Generator
Following the common practice, researchers from the generative
modeling community always publish their well-trained generators
and code, which allows users to generate new samples and validate
the results. This corresponds to the settings that the generator is
accessible to the adversary in a white-box manner, i.e. the attackers
have access to the internals of the generator. This scenario is also
commonly studied in the community of differential privacy [16]
and privacy preserving data generation [2, 7, 11, 35, 66, 73], where
people enforce privacy guarantee by training and sharing their gen-
erative models instead of sharing the raw private data. Our attack
model under this setting can serve as a practical tool for empirically
estimating the privacy risk incurred by sharing the differentially
private generative models, which offers clear interpretability to-
wards bridging between theory and practice. However, this setting
has not been explored by any previous work and is a novel case
for constructing a membership inference attack against GANs. It
corresponds to the second last row in Table 1 and Section 5.4.
4.3 Partial Black-box Generator (Known
Input-output Pair)
This is a less knowledgeable setting to attackers where they have
no access to the internals of the generator but have access to the
latent code of each generated sample. This is a practical setting
where the developers retain ownership of their well-trained models
while allowing users to control the properties of the generated
samples by manipulating the latent code distribution [32], which
is a desired feature for application scenarios such as GAN-based
Notation Description
A Attacker
M model publishing mechanism
Dtrain Training set of the victim generator
S Query set
R Attacker’s reconstructor
x Query sample
m Membership indicator variable
z Latent code (input to the generator)
Gv Victim generator
Gr Attacker’s reference generator, described in Section 5.6
θv Victim model’s parameter
θr Attacker’s reference model’s parameter
Table 2: Notations.
image processing [22] and facial attribute editing [27, 37]. This is
another novel setting and not considered in previous works [25, 29].
It corresponds to the third last row in Table 1 and Section 5.3.
4.4 Full Black-box Generator (Known Output
Only)
This is the least knowledgeable setting to attackers where they
are passive, i.e., unable to provide input, but are only permitted to
access the generated samples set from the well-trained black-box
generator. Hayes et al. [25] investigate attacks in this setting by
retraining a local copy of the victim model. Hilprecht et al. [29]
count the number of generated samples that are inside an ϵ-ball of
the query, based on an elaborate design of distance metric. Our idea
is similar in spirit to Hilprecht et al. [29] but we score each query
by the reconstruction error directly, which does not introduce addi-
tional hyperparameter while achieving superior performance. In
short, we design a low-skill attack method with a simpler implemen-
tation (Section 5.2) that achieves comparable or better performance
(Section 6.3). Our attack and theirs correspond to the third, second,
and first rows in Table 1, respectively.
5 ATTACK MODEL
5.1 Generic Attack Model
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the optimal attacker computes the
probability P(mi = 1|xi ,θv ). Specifically for the generative model,
wemake the assumption that this probability should be proportional
to the probability that the query sample can be generated by the
generator. This assumption holds in general as the generative model
is trained to approximate the training data distribution, i.e., PGv ≈
PDtrain whereGv denotes the victim generator. And if the probability
that the query sample is generated by the victim generator is large,
it is more likely that the query sample is used to train the generative
model. Formally,
P(mi = 1|xi ,θv ) ∝ PGv (x |θv ) (2)
However, computing the exact probability is intractable as the
distribution of the generated data cannot be represented with an
explicit density function. Therefore, we adopt the Parzen window
PGv
PDtrain
x1 ∈ Dtrain
R(x1|Gv)
x2 /∈ Dtrain
R(x2|Gv)
Attacker decision
boundary
(a) Generic attack model (Section 5.1)
PGv
PDtrain
x1 ∈ Dtrain
R(x1|Gv)
x2 /∈ Dtrain
R(x2|Gv)
(b) Full black-box attack (Section 5.2)
PGv
PDtrain
12
34
56
43
54
32
52
34
52
43
53
45
24
3
12345643wrwerwer54
x1 ∈ Dtrain
R(x1|Gv)
x2 /∈ Dtrain
R(x2|Gv)
(c) Partial black-box andwhite-box attack
(Section 5.3 and Section 5.4)
PGv
PDtrain
PGr
x1 ∈ Dtrain
R(x1|Gv)
R(x1|Gr)
x2 /∈ Dtrain
R(x2|Gv)
R(x2|Gr)
(d) Attack calibration (Section 5.6)
Figure 2: Diagram of our attacks. Mathematical notations refer to Table 2. P represents data distribution. x1 belongs to Dtrain
so that it should be better represented by Gv with a smaller distance to its reconstructed copy R(x1 |Gv ). x2 does not belong to
Dtrain so that it should have a larger distance to its best approximation R(x2 |Gv ) in PGv . (a) Our generic attacker set a decision
boundary based on the reconstruction distance to infer membership. (b) The best reconstruction is determined over random
samples from PGv while in (c) it is found by optimization on the manifold of PGv . (d) PGr is a third-party reference GAN
distribution where the reconstruction distance is calibrated by the distance between x and R(x |Gr ).
density estimation [15] and approximate the probability as below,
PGv (x |θv ) =
1
k
k∑
i=1
ϕ(x ,Gv (zi )); zi ∼ Pz (3)
≈ 1
k
k∑
i=1
exp(−L(x ,Gv (zi ))); zi ∼ Pz (4)
where ϕ(·, ·) denotes the kernel function, L(·, ·) is the general dis-
tance metric defined in Section 5.5, and k is the number of samples.
Note that this can be further simplified andwell approximated using
only few samples [9], as all of the terms in the summation of Equa-
tion 3, except for a few, will be negligible since ϕ(x ,y) exponentially
decreases with distance between x ,y.
5.2 Full Black-box Attack
We start with the least knowledgeable setting where an attacker
only has access to a black-box generator Gv . The attacker is allowed
no other operation but blindly collecting k samples from Gv , de-
noted as {Gv (·)i }ki=1. Gv (·) indicates that the attacker has neither
access nor control over latent code input. We then approximate the
probability in Equation 4 using the largest term which is given by
the nearest neighbor to x among {Gv (·)i }ki=1. Formally,
R(x |Gv ) = argmin
xˆ ∈{Gv (·)i }ki=1
L(x , xˆ) (5)
See Figure 2(b) for a diagram. This approximation bound the com-
plete Parzen window from below, but in practice we observe almost
no difference when incorporating more terms in the summation for
a fixed k . However, we find the estimation more sensitive to k , and
in general a larger k leads to better reconstructions (Figure 10) but
at the price of a higher query and computation cost. Throughout
the experiments, we consider a practical and limited budget and
choose k to be of the same magnitude as the training dataset size.
5.3 Partial Black-box Attack
In some practical scenario discussed in Section 4.3, the access to the
latent code z is permitted. We then propose to exploit z in order to
find a better reconstruction of the query sample and thus improve
the PGv (x |θv ) estimation. Concretely, the attacker performs an
black-box optimization with respect to z. Formally,
R(x |Gv ) = Gv (z∗) (6)
where
z∗ = argmin
z
L
(
x ,Gv (z)
)
(7)
Without knowing the internals of Gv , the optimization is not
differentiable and no gradient information is available. As only
the evaluation of function (forward-pass through the generator) is
allowed by the access of {z,Gv (z)} pair, we propose to approximate
the optimum via the Powell’s Conjugate Direction Method [53].
5.4 White-box Attack
In the white-box setting, we have the same reconstruction for-
mulation as in Section 5.3. See Figure 2(c) for a diagram. More
advantageously to attackers, the reconstruction quality can be
further boosted thanks to access to the internals of Gv . With ac-
cess to the gradient information, the optimization problem can
be more accurately solved by advanced first-order optimization
algorithms [39, 46, 63]. In our experiment, we apply the L-BFGS
algorithm for its robustness against suboptimal initialization and
its superior convergence rate in comparison to the other methods.
5.5 Distance Metric
Our distance metric L(·, ·) consists of three terms: the element-wise
(pixel-wise) difference term L2 targets low-frequency components,
the deep image feature term Llpips (i.e., the Learned Perceptual
Image Patch Similarity (LPIPS) metric [72]) targets realism details,
and the regularization term penalizes latent code far from the prior
x /∈ Dtrain R(x|Gv) R(x|Gr)
L(x,R(x|Gv))
L
c
a
l(
x
,
R
(x
|G
v
))
²cal
²
x ∈ Dtrain R(x|Gv) R(x|Gr)
Figure 3: The effectiveness of calibration when attacking PGGAN on CelebA. The x- and y-axes respectively represent the
distance before (L) and after calibration (Lcal) between a query sample x and its reconstruction R(x |Gv ). ϵ and ϵcal are the
corresponding thresholds for classification. The false-positive (in purple frame) as well as the false-negative samples (in red
frame) before (L) calibration can be corrected by calibration (Lcal).
distribution. Mathematically,
L
(
x ,Gv (z)
)
=λ1L2
(
x ,Gv (z)
)
+ λ2Llpips
(
x ,Gv (z)
)
+ λ3Lreg(z) (8)
where
L2
(
x ,Gv (z)
)
= ∥x − Gv (z)∥22 (9)
Lreg(z) =
(∥z∥22 − dim(z))2 (10)
λ1, λ2 and λ3 are used to enable/disable and balance the order of
magnitude of each loss term. For non-image data, λ2 = 0 because
LPIPS is no longer applicable. For full black-box attack, λ3 = 0 as
the constraint z ∼ Pz is satisfied by the sampling process.
5.6 Attack Calibration
We noticed that the reconstruction error is query-dependent, i.e.,
some query samples are more (less) difficult to reconstruct due to
their intrinsically more (less) complicated representations, regard-
less of which generator is used. In this case, the reconstruction error
is dominated by the representations rather than by the membership
clues. We, therefore, propose to mitigate the query dependency by
first independently training a reference GAN Gr with a relevant
but disjoint dataset, and then calibrating our base reconstruction
error according to the reference reconstruction error. Formally,
Lcal
(
x ,R(x |Gv )
)
= L
(
x ,R(x |Gv )
) − L (x ,R(x |Gr )) (11)
with R the reconstruction. As demonstrated in Figure 3, we show
in the up-left quadrant the query samples in purple frame that are
classified as in Dtrain by L and as not in Dtrain by Lcal. They are
false-positive to L but are corrected to true-negative by Lcal. On
the other hand, we show in the bottom-right quadrant the query
samples in red frame that are classified as not in Dtrain by L and
as in Dtrain by Lcal. They are false-negative to L but are corrected
to true-positive by Lcal. We compare all these samples, their recon-
structions from the victim generator Gv , and their reconstructions
from the reference generator Gr on the two sides of the plot. The
false-positive samples by L on the left-hand side are those with less
complicated appearances such that their reconstruction errors are
not high given arbitrary generators. In contrast, the false-negative
samples by L on the right-hand side are those with more compli-
cated appearances such that their reconstruction errors are high
given arbitrary generators. Our calibration can effectively miti-
gate these two types of misclassification that depend on sample
representations.
As discussed in Section 3.2, the optimal attacker aims to compute
the membership probability
P(mi = 1|θv ,xi ) = ES [P(mi = 1|θv ,xi , S)] (12)
Specifically, inferring themembership of the query samplexi amounts
to approximating the value of P(mi = 1|θv ,xi , S) [57]. We show
that our calibrated loss well approximate this probability by the
following theorem, whose proof is provided in Appendix.
Theorem 5.1. Given the victim model with parameter θv , a query
dataset S , the membership probability of a query sample xi is well
approximated by the sigmoid of minus calibrated reconstruction error.
P(mi = 1|θv ,xi , S) ≈ σ (−Lcal(xi ,R(xi |Gv )) (13)
And the optimal attack is equivalent to
A(xi ,M(θv )) = 1[Lcal(xi ,R(xi |Gv )) < ϵ] (14)
i.e., the attacker checks whether the calibrated reconstruction error of
the query sample xi is smaller than a threshold ϵ .
In the white-box case, the reference model has the same archi-
tecture as the victim model as this information is accessible to the
attacker. In the full black-box and partial black-box settings, Gr has
irrelevant network architectures to Gv , which is fixed across attack
scenarios. The optimization on the well-trained Gr is the same as
on the white-box Gv . See Figure 2(d) for a diagram, and Section 6.6
for implementation details.
6 EXPERIMENTS
Based on the proposed taxonomy, we present the most compre-
hensive evaluation to date on the membership inference attacks
(a) PGGAN (b) WGANGP (c) DCGAN (d) VAEGAN (e) PGGAN w/ DP
Figure 4: Generated images from different victim GAN models trained on CelebA.
against deep generative models. While prior studies have singled
out few data sets from constraint domains on selected models, our
evaluation includes three diverse datasets, five different generative
models, and systematic analysis of attack vectors – including more
viable threat models. Via this approach, we present key discoveries,
that connect for the first time the effectiveness of the attacks to the
model types, data sets, and training configuration.
6.1 Setup
Datasets:We conduct experiments on three diverse modalities of
datasets covering images, medical records, and location check-ins,
which are considered with a high risk of privacy breach.
CelebA [47] is a large-scale face attributes dataset with 200k RGB
images. Images are aligned to each other based on facial landmarks,
which benefits GAN performance. We select at most 20k images,
center-crop them, and resize them to 64 × 64 before GAN training.
MIMIC-III [34] is a public Electronic Health Records (EHR) data-
base containing medical records of 46, 520 intensive care unit (ICU)
patients. We follow the same procedure as in [12] to pre-process
the data, where each patient is represented by a 1071-dimensional
binary feature vector. We filter out patients with repeated vector
presentations and yield 41, 307 unique samples.
Instagram New-York [6] contains Instagram users’ check-ins at
various locations in New York at different time stamps from 2013
to 2017. We filter out users with less than 100 check-ins and yield
34, 336 remaining samples. For sample representation, we first select
2, 024 evenly-distributed time stamps. We then concatenate the
longitude and latitude values of the check-in location at each time
stamp, and yield a 4048-dimensional vector for each sample. The
longitude and latitude values are either retrieved from the dataset
or linearly interpolated from the available neighboring time stamps.
We then perform zero-mean normalization before GAN training.
Victim GANModels:We select PGGAN [36], WGANGP [23], DC-
GAN [54], MEDGAN [12], and VAEGAN [8] into the victim model
set, considering their pleasing performance on generating images
and/or other data representations.
It is important to guarantee the high quality of well-trained
GANs because attackers aremore likely to target high-quality GANs
with practical effectiveness. We noticed previous works [25, 29]
only show qualitative results of their victim GANs. In particular,
Hayes et al. [25] did not show visually pleasing generated results on
the Labeled Faces in theWild (LFW) dataset [31]. Rather, we present
better qualitative results of different GANs on CelebA (Figure 4),
PG- WGAN- DC- VAE- SOTA PGGAN
GAN GP GAN GAN ref w/ DP
FID 14.86 24.26 35.40 53.08 7.40 15.63
Table 3: FID for different GAN models trained on CelebA.
“SOTA ref” represents the state-of-the-art result reported
in [10] over 128 × 128 ImageNet ILSVRC 2012 dataset [56].
“w/ DP” represents the GAN model with DP privacy protec-
tion [1] (see Section 6.8).
and further present the corresponding quantitative evaluation in
terms of Fréchet Inception Distance (FID) metric [28] (Table 3).
A smaller FID indicates the generated image set is more realistic
and closer to real-world data distribution. We show that our GAN
models are in a reasonable range to the state of the art.
Attack Evaluation: The proposed membership inference attack
is formulated as a binary classification given a threshold ϵ in Equa-
tion 14. Through varying ϵ , we measure the area under the receiver
operating characteristic curve (AUCROC) to evaluate the attack
performance.
6.2 Analysis Study
We first list two dimensions of analysis study across attack settings.
There are also some other dimensions specifically for the white-box
attack, which are elaborated in Section 6.5.
6.2.1 GAN Training Set Size. Training set size is highly related to
the degree of overfitting of GAN training. A GAN model trained
with a smaller size tends to more easily memorize individual train-
ing images and is thus more vulnerable to membership inference
attack. Moreover, training set size is the main factor that affects
the privacy cost computation for differential privacy. Therefore, we
evaluate the attack performance w.r.t. training set size. We exclude
DCGAN and VAEGAN from evaluation since they yield unstable
training for small training sets.
6.2.2 Random v.s. Identity-based Selection for GAN Training Set.
There are different levels of difficulty for membership inference
attack. For example, CelebA contains person identity information
and we can design attack difficulty by composing GAN training
set based on identity or not. In one case, we include all images
of the selected individuals for training(identity). In the other case,
we ignore identity information and randomly select images for
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 20k
size of dataset
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
A
U
C
R
O
C
CelebA (full black-box)
PGGAN
WGANGP
(a)
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192
size of dataset
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
A
U
C
R
O
C
MIMIC-III (full black-box)
WGANGP
MEDGAN
(b)
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192 10k
size of dataset
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
A
U
C
R
O
C
Instagram (full black-box)
WGANGP
(c)
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 20k
size of dataset
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
A
U
C
R
O
C
CelebA (white-box)
PGGAN
WGANGP
(d)
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192
size of dataset
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
A
U
C
R
O
C
MIMIC-III (white-box)
WGANGP
MEDGAN
(e)
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192 10k
size of dataset
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
A
U
C
R
O
C
Instagram (white-box)
WGANGP
(f)
Figure 5: Full black-box attack (the first row) and white-box attack (the second row) performance w.r.t. GAN training set size.
training(random), i.e., it is possible that some images for an indi-
vidual are in the training dataset while some are not. The former
case is relatively easier to attackers with a larger margin between
membership image set and non-membership image set. In line with
previous work [25], we evaluate these two kinds of training set
selection schemes on CelebA for a complete and fair comparison.
6.3 Evaluation on Full Black-box Attack
We start with evaluating our preliminary low-skill black-box attack
model in order to gain a sense of the difficulty of the whole problem.
6.3.1 Performance w.r.t. GAN Training Set Size. Figure 5(a) to Fig-
ure 5(c) plot the attack performance against different GAN models
on the three datasets. As shown in the plots, the attack performs
sufficiently well when the training set is small for all three datasets.
For instance, on CelebA, when the training set contains up to 512
images, attacker’s AUCROC on both PGGAN and WGANGP are
above 0.95. This indicates an almost perfect attack and a serious
privacy breach. For larger training sets, however, the attacks be-
come less effective as the degree of overfitting decreases and GAN’s
capability shifts from memorization to generalization. It is also
consistent with the objective of GAN, i.e., to model the underlying
distribution of the whole population instead of fitting a particular
data sample. Hence, the collection of more data for GAN training
can reduce privacy breach of individual samples. Moreover, PG-
GAN becomes more vulnerable than WGANGP on CelebA when
the training size becomes larger. WGANGP is consistently more
vulnerable than MEDGAN on MIMIC-III regardless of training size.
6.3.2 Performance w.r.t. GAN Training Set Selection. Figure 6(a)
shows the attack performance w.r.t. training set selection schemes
on four victim GAN models when fixing the training set size. We
observe that, consistently, all the GAN models are more vulnerable
when the training set is selected based on identity. Hence, more at-
tention needs to be paid to an identity-based privacy breach, which
is more likely to happen than an instance-based privacy breach.
Moreover, when compared among different victim GAN models,
DCGAN and VAEGAN are more resistant against the full black-box
attack with AUCROC only marginally above 0.5 (random guess
baseline). This may be attributed to the poor generation quality
of DCGAN and VAEGAN (Table 3), as it indicates that a certain
amount of data samples can not be well represented by the victim
model and thus the reconstruction error will be a less accurate
approximation of the true membership probability in Equation 2.
6.4 Evaluation on Partial Black-box Attack
6.4.1 Performance w.r.t. GAN Training Set Selection. Figure 6(b)
shows the comparison on four victim GAN models. Similar to the
case of the full black-box attack (Section 6.3), we find that all models
become more vulnerable to identity-based selection. Still, DCGAN
is the most resistant victim against membership inference in both
training set selection schemes, probably due to its inferior genera-
tion quality.
6.4.2 Comparison to Full Black-box Attack. Comparing between
Figure 6(a) and Figure 6(b), the attack performance against each
GAN model consistently and significantly improves from black-box
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Figure 6: Attack performance on the random v.s. identity-based training set selection (CelebA with size=20k).
setting to partial black-box setting. We attribute this improvement
to a better reconstruction of query samples found by the attacker via
optimization. Hence, we conclude that providing the input interface
to a generator suffers from an increased privacy risk.
6.5 Evaluation on White-box Attack
We further investigate the case where the victim generator is pub-
lished in a white-box manner. This scenario is commonly studied in
the field of privacy preserving data generation [2, 7, 11, 35, 66, 73],
where our approach can serve as a simple and interpretable frame-
work for empirically quantifying the privacy leakage. As the opti-
mization in the white-box attack involves more technical details, we
conduct additional analysis study and sanity check in this setting.
See Appendix C.1 for more details.
6.5.1 Performance w.r.t. GAN Training Set Size. Figure 5(d) to Fig-
ure 5(f) plot the attack performance against different GAN models
on the three datasets when varying training set size. We find that
the attack becomes less effective as the training set becomes larger,
similar to that in the black-box setting. For CelebA, the attack re-
mains effective for 20k training samples, while for MIMIC-III and
Instagram, this number decreases to 8192 and 2048, respectively.
The strong similarity between the member and non-member in
these two non-image datasets increases the difficulty of attack,
which explains the deteriorated effectiveness of the attack model.
6.5.2 Performance w.r.t. GAN Training Set Selection. Figure 6(c)
shows the comparisons against four victim GANmodels. Our attack
is muchmore effective when composing GAN training set according
to identity, which is similar to those in the full and partial black-box
settings.
6.5.3 Comparison to Full and Partial Black-box Attacks. For mem-
bership inference attack, it is an important question whether or
to what extent the white-box attack is more effective than the
black-box ones. For discriminative (classification) models, recent lit-
erature reports that the state-of-the-art black-box attack performs
almost as well as the white-box attack [51, 57]. In contrast, we
find that against generative models the white-box attack is much
more effective. Comparisons across subfigures in Figure 6 show
that the AUCROC values increase by at least 0.03 when changing
from full black-box to white-box setting. Compared to the partial
black-box attack, the white-box attack achieves noticeably better
performance against PGGAN and VAEGAN. Moreover, conducting
the white-box attack requires much less computation cost than
conducting the partial black-box attack. Therefore, we conclude
that publicizing model parameters (white-box setting) does incur
high privacy breach risk.
6.6 Performance Gain from Attack Calibration
We perform calibration on all the settings. Note that for full and
partial black-box settings, attackers do not have prior knowledge
of victim model architectures. We thus train a PGGAN on LFW
face dataset [31] and use it as the generic reference model for
calibrating all victim models trained on CelebA in the black-box
settings. Similarly, for MIMIC-III, we useWGANGP as the reference
model for MedGAN and vice versa. In other words, we have to
guarantee that our calibrated attacks strictly follow the black-box
assumption.
Figure 7 compares attack performance on CelebA before and
after applying calibration. The AUCROC values are improved con-
sistently across all the GAN architectures in all the settings. In
general, the white-box attack calibration yields the greatest perfor-
mance gain. Moreover, the improvement is especially significant
when attacking against VAEGAN, as the AUCROC value increases
by 0.2 after applying calibration.
Figure 8 compares attack performance on the other two non-
image datasets. The performance is also consistently boosted for
all training set sizes after calibration.
6.7 Comparison to Baseline Attacks
We compare our calibrated attack to two recent membership infer-
ence attack baselines: Hayes et al. [25] (denoted as LOGAN) and
Hilprecht et al. [29] (denoted asMC, standing for their proposed
Monte Carlo sampling method). As described in our taxonomy
(Section 4), LOGAN includes a full black-box attack model and a
discriminator-accessible attack model against GANs. The latter is
regarded as the most knowledgeable but unrealistic setting because
the discriminator in GAN is usually not accessible in practice. But
we still compare to both settings for the completeness of our taxon-
omy and experiments. MC includes a full black-box attack against
GANs and a full-model-accessible attack against VAEs. We evaluate
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Figure 7: Attack performance before and after calibration on CelebA (size=20k).
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Figure 8: Attack performance before and after calibration for non-image datasets w.r.t. GAN training set sizes.
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Figure 9: Comparison of different attacks on CelebA. See Ta-
ble 12 in Appendix for quantitative results.
our generic attack model on both GANs and VAEs for a complete
comparison, though we mainly focus on GANs in this work. Note
that, to the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any attack
against GANs in the partial black-box or white-box settings.
Figure 9, Figure 10, and Figure 11 show the comparisons, consid-
ering several datasets, victim models, training set sizes, numbers
of query images (full black-box), and different attack settings. We
skip MC on the non-image datasets as it is not directly applicable
in terms of their distance calculation. Our findings are as follows.
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Figure 10: Full black-box attack performance against PG-
GAN on CelebA w.r.t. k in Equation 5, the number of gen-
erated samples. See Table 14 in Appendix for quantitative
results.
In the black-box setting, our low-skill attack consistently out-
performs MC and outperforms LOGAN on the non-image datasets.
It also achieves comparable performance to LOGAN on CelebA but
with a much simpler and learning-free implementation.
Our white-box and even partial black-box attacks consistently
outperform the other full black-box attacks. Hence, publicizing the
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Figure 11: Comparison of different attacks on the other two non-image datasets w.r.t. GAN training set size. See Table 13 in
Appendix for quantitative results.
generator or even just the input to the generator can lead to a con-
siderably higher risk of privacy breach. With a complete spectrum
of performance across settings, they bridge the performance gap
between the highly constrained full black-box attack and the un-
realistic discriminator-accessible attack. Moreover, our proposed
white-box attack model is of practical value for the differential
privacy community.
Assuming the accessibility of discriminator (full model) normally
results in the most effective attack. This can be explained by the
fact that the discriminator is explicitly trained to maximize the
margin between training set (membership samples) and generated
set (a subset of non-membership samples), which eventually yields
very accurate confidence scores for membership inference. Surpris-
ingly, our calibrated white-box attack even outperforms baseline
methods in more knowledgeable settings, i.e., LOGAN (accessible
discriminator) for VAEGAN and MC (accessible full model) for VAE.
This shows that when data coverage is explicitly enforced, which
probably leads to overfitting and data memorization if not properly
regularized, our attack models are highly effectively and achieve
superior performance with a more realistic assumption.
6.8 Defense
We investigate the most effective defense mechanism against MIA
to date that is applicable to GANs [7, 25, 66, 73], i.e., the differ-
ential private (DP) stochastic gradient descent [1]. The algorithm
can be summarized into two steps. First, the per-sample gradient
computed at each training iteration is clipped by its L2 norm with
a pre-defined threshold. Subsequently, calibrated random noise is
added to the gradient in order to inject stochasticity for protecting
privacy. In this scheme, however, privacy protection is at the cost
of computational complexity and utility deterioration, i.e., slower
training and lower generation quality.
We conduct attacks against PGGAN on CelebA, which has been
defended by DP. We skip the other cases because DP always de-
teriorates generation quality to an unacceptable level. The hyper-
parameters are selected through the grid search. We fix the norm
threshold to 1.0 (average gradient norm magnitude during pre-
training) and the noise scale to 10−4 (the largest value with which
we obtain samples of good visual quality). However, this results in
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Figure 12: (a) Attack performance against PGGANonCelebA
with or without DP defense. (b)Attack performance against
PGGAN on CelebA with or without DP defense, w.r.t. GAN
training set size. We fix all the other control factors (train-
ing iterations, batch size, noise scale, norm threshold) apart
from training set size, which results in less privacy guaran-
tee for a smaller dataset.
high ϵ values (> 1010 for a default value of δ = 10−5), while it still
reduces the effectiveness of the membership inference attack.
Figure 12(a) and Figure 12(b) depict the attack performance in
different settings. We observe a consistent decrease in AUCROC
in all the settings. Therefore, DP is effective in general against our
attack. However, applying DP into training leads to a much higher
computation cost (10× slower) in practice due to the per-sample
gradient modification. Moreover, DP results in a deterioration of
GAN utility, which is witnessed by an increasing FID (comparing
the last and second columns in Table 3). Moreover, for obtaining
a pleasing level of utility, the noise scale has to be limited to a
small value, which, in turn, cannot defend the membership infer-
ence attack completely. For example, for all the settings, our attack
still achieves better performance than the random guess baseline
(AUCROC = 0.5).
6.9 Summary
Before ending this section, we show a few insights over the ex-
periment results and list practical considerations relevant to the
deployment of GANs and potential privacy breaches.
• The vulnerability of models under MIA heavily relies on the
attackers’ knowledge about victim models. Releasing the
discriminator (full model) results in an exceptionally high
risk of privacy breach, which can be explained by the fact
that the discriminator had full access to the training data
and thus easily memorizes the private information about the
training data. Similarly, the release of the generator and/or
the control over the input noise z also incurs a relatively
high privacy risk.
• The vulnerability of different generative models under MIA
varies. Although the effectiveness of MIA mainly depends on
the generation quality of victim models, the objective func-
tion and training paradigm also play important roles. Specif-
ically, when data reconstruction is explicitly formulated in
the training objective to improve data mode coverage, e.g.
in VAEGAN and VAE, the resulting models become highly
vulnerable to MIA.
• A smaller training dataset leads to a higher risk of revealing
information of individual samples. In particular, if the magni-
tude of training set size is less than 10k where most existing
GAN models have sufficient modeling capacity for overfit-
ting to individual sample, the membership privacy is highly
likely to be compromised once the GAN model and/or its
generated sample set is released. This causes special concern
when dealing with real-world privacy sensitive datasets (e.g.
medical records), which typically contain very limited data
samples.
• Differential private defense on GAN training is effective
against practical MIA, but at the cost of high computation
burden and deteriorated generation quality.
7 CONCLUSION
We have established the first taxonomy of membership inference at-
tacks against GANs, with which we hope to benchmark research in
this direction in the future. We have also proposed the first generic
attack model based on reconstruction, which is applicable to all the
settings according to the amount of the attacker’s knowledge about
the victim model. In particular, the instantiated attack variants in
the partial black-box and white-box settings are another novelty
that bridges the assumption gap and performance gap in the previ-
ous work [25, 29]. In addition, we proposed a novel theoretically
grounded attack calibration technique, which consistently improve
the attack performance in all cases. Comprehensive experiments
show consistent effectiveness and a broad spectrum of performance
in a variety of setups spanning diverse dataset modalities, various
victim models, two directions of analysis study, attack calibration,
as well as differential privacy defense, which conclusively provide
a better understanding of privacy risks associated with deep gener-
ative models.
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A PROOF
Theorem 5.1. Given the victim model with parameter θv , a query
dataset S , the membership probability of a query sample xi is well
approximated by the sigmoid of minus calibrated reconstruction error.
P(mi = 1|θv ,xi , S) ≈ σ (−Lcal(xi ,R(xi |Gv )) (15)
And the optimal attack is equivalent to
A(xi ,M(θv )) = 1[Lcal(xi ,R(xi |Gv )) < ϵ] (16)
i.e., the attacker checks whether the calibrated reconstruction error of
the query sample xi is smaller than a threshold ϵ .
Proof. By applying the Bayes rule and the property of sigmoid
function σ , the membership probability can be rewritten as fol-
lows [57]:
P(mi = 1|θv ,xi , S) = σ
(
log
(
P(θv |mi = 1,xi , S−i )P(mi = 1)
P(θv |mi = 0,xi , S−i )P(mi = 0)
))
(17)
where S−i = S\(xi ,mi ), i.e., the whole query set except the query
sample xi .
Assuming independence of samples in S while applying Bayes rule
and Product rule, we obtain the following posterior approximation
P(θv |S) ∝
∏
{j |mj=1}
P(x j |θv )P(θv ) (18)
∝ exp(−
∑
j
mj · l(x j ,θv )) (19)
with l(x j ,θv ) = L(x j ,R(x |Gv ))for brevity. The Equation 18 means
that the probability of a certain model parameter is determined by
its i.i.d. training set samples. Subsequently, by assuming a uniform
prior of the model parameter over the whole parameter space and
plug in the results from Equation 4 we obtain Equation 19.
By normalizing the posterior in Equation 19, we obtain
P(θv |mi = 1,xi , S−i ) =
exp(−∑jmj · l(x j ,θv ))∫
θ ′ exp(−
∑
jmj · l(x j ,θ ′))dθ ′
(20)
P(θv |mi = 0,xi , S−i ) =
exp(−∑j,imj · l(x j ,θv ))∫
θ ′ exp(−
∑
j,imj · l(x j ,θ ′))dθ ′
(21)
with the following ratio:
P(θv |mi = 1,xi , S)
P(θv |mi = 0,xi , S) =
exp(−l(xi ,θv ))∫
θ ′ exp(−l(xi ,θ ′))P(θ ′ |S−i )dθ ′
(22)
where
P(θ |S−i ) =
exp(−∑j,imj · l(x j ,θ ))∫
θ ′ exp(−
∑
j,imj · l(x j ,θ ′))dθ ′
Putting things together, we have
P(mi = 1|θv ,xi , S) = σ [ log(P(mi = 1)
P(mi = 0) ) − l(xi ,θv )
− log
(∫
θ ′
exp(−l(xi ,θ ′))P(θ ′ |S−i )dθ ′
)
]
(23)
The first term is equivalent to the log ratio of the prior probabil-
ity, i.e., the fraction of training data in the query set. In most of
our experiments, we use a balanced split which makes this term
vanish. Thus, only the second and last term will affect the attacker
prediction. Next, we investigate the last term. By applying Jensen’s
inequality, we can bound the last term from above.
− log
(∫
θ ′
exp(−l(x j ,θ ′))P(θ ′ |S−i )dθ ′
)
= − logEθ ′ exp(−l(xi ,θ ′))
≤ −Eθ ′ log exp(−l(xi ,θ ′))
= Eθ ′l(xi ,θ ′) (24)
Additionally, we can obtain the lower bound by taking the optimi-
mum over the full parameter space, i.e.
− log
(∫
θ ′
exp(−l(x j ,θ ′))P(θ ′ |S−i )dθ ′
)
≥ − logmax
θ ′
exp(−l(xi ,θ ′))
= min
θ ′
l(xi ,θ ′) (25)
Under the assumption of a highly peaked posterior, e.g. uni-modal
Gaussian [57], we can well approximate this quantity by using one
sample, i.e. using one reference model that is not trained on the
query sample. Formally,
P(mi = 1|θv ,xi , S) ≈ σ [−l(xi ,θv ) + l(xi ,θr )]
= σ [−L(x ,R(x |Gv )) + L(x ,R(x |Gr )]
= σ [−Lcal(x ,R(x |Gv )] (26)
where the dependence on S,θv is absorbed in the calibrated distance
Lcal(x ,R(x |Gv )).
Hence, the optimal attacker classifies xi as in the training set if the
membership probability is sufficiently large, i.e., Lcal(x ,R(x |Gv ))
is sufficiently small (than a threshold), following from the non-
decreasing property of σ . □
B EXPERIMENT SETUP
B.1 Hyper-parameter Setting
We fix k to be 20k for evaluating the full black-box attacks. We set
λ1 = 1.0, λ2 = 0.2, λ3 = 0.001 for our partial black-box and white-
box attack on CelebA, and set λ1 = 1.0, λ2 = 0.0, λ3 = 0.0 for the
other cases. The maximum number of iterations for optimization
are set to be 1000 for our white-box attack and 10 for our partial
black-box attack.
B.2 Model Architectures
We use the official implementations of the victim GANmodels.3 We
re-implement WGANGP model with a fully-connected structure
for non-image datasets. The network architecture is summarized in
Table 4. The depth of both the generator and discriminator is set to
5. The dimension of the hidden layer is fix to be 512 . We use ReLU
as the activation function for the generator and Leaky ReLU with
α = 0.2 for the discriminator, except for the output layer where
either the sigmoid or identity function is used.
Generator Generator Discriminator
(MIMIC-III) (Instagram) (MIMIC-III and Instagram)
FC (512) FC (512) FC (512)
ReLU ReLU LeakyReLU (0.2)
FC (512) FC (512) FC (512)
ReLU ReLU LeakyReLU (0.2)
FC (512) FC (512) FC (512)
ReLU ReLU LeakyReLU (0.2)
FC (512) FC (512) FC (512)
ReLU ReLU LeakyReLU (0.2)
FC (dim(x)) FC (dim(x)) FC (1)
Sigmoid Identity Identity
Table 4: Network architecutre of WGANGP on MIMIC-III
and Instagram.
B.3 Implementation of Baseline Attacks
We provide more details of implementing baseline attacks that are
discussed in Section 6.7.
B.3.1 LOGAN. For CelebA,we employDCGANas the attackmodel,
which is the same as in the original paper [25]. For MIMIC-III and
Instagram, we use WGANGP as the attack model.
B.3.2 MC. For implementing MC in the full black-box setting on
CelebA, we apply the same process of their best attack on the RGB
image dataset: First, we employ principal component analysis (PCA)
on a data subset disjoint from the query data. Then, we keep the
first 120 PCA components as suggested in the original paper [29]
and apply dimensionality reduction on the generated and query
data. Finally, we calculate the Euclidean distance of the projected
data and use the median heuristic to choose the threshold for MC
attack.
C ADDITIONAL RESULTS
C.1 Sanity-check in the White-box Setting
C.1.1 Analysis on optimization initialization. Due to the non-convexity
of our optimization problem, the choice of initialization is of great
importance. We explore three different initialization heuristics in
3 https://github.com/tkarras/progressive_growing_of_gans,
https://github.com/igul222/improved_wgan_training,
https://github.com/carpedm20/DCGAN-tensorflow,
https://github.com/mp2893/medgan,
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/10RCFaA8kOgkRHXIJpXIWAC-
uUyLiEhlY
our experiments, including mean (z0 = µ), random (z0 ∼ N(µ, Σ)),
and nearest neighbour (z0 = argminz∈{zi }ki=1 ∥Gv (z) − x ∥
2
2 ). We
find that the mean and nearest neighbor initializations perform
well in practice, and are in general better than random initializa-
tion in terms of the successful reconstruction rate (reconstruction
error smaller than 0.01). Therefore, we apply the mean and nearest
neighbor initialization in parallel, and choose the one with smaller
reconstruction error for the attack.
C.1.2 Analysis on Optimization Method. We explore three opti-
mizers with a range of hyper-parameter search: Adam [39], RM-
SProp [63], and L-BFGS [46] for reconstructing generated samples
of PGGAN on CelebA. Figure 13 shows that L-BFGS achieves supe-
rior convergence rate with no additional hyper-parameter. There-
fore, we select L-BFGS as our default optimizer in the white-box
setting.
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Figure 13: Convergence rate of various optimizers (Adam,
RMSProp, L-BFGS) with different learning rates. Mean ini-
tialization (z0 = µ) is applied in this analysis study.
C.1.3 Analysis on Distance Metric Design for Optimization. We
show the effectiveness of our objective design (Equation 8). Al-
though optimizing only for element-wise difference term L2 yields
reasonably good reconstruction in most cases, we observe unde-
sired blur in reconstruction for CelebA images. Incorporating deep
image feature term Llpips and regularization term Lreg benefits the
successful reconstruction rate. See Figure 14 for a demonstration.
Table 5: Successful reconstruction rate for generated sam-
ples from different GANs.
DCGAN PGGAN WGANGP VAEGAN
Success rate (%) 99.89 99.83 99.55 99.25
C.1.4 Sanity Check on Distance Metric Design for Optimization. In
addition, we check if the non-convexity of our objective function
affects the feasibility of attack against different victim GANs. We
apply optimization to reconstruct generated samples. Ideally, the
reconstruction should have no error because the query samples are
directly generated by the model, i.e., their preimages exist. We set a
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Figure 14: Reconstruction error plots of PGGAN-generated samples on CelebA. The x-axis represents the Euclidean distance
between a reconstructed latent code to its ground truth value. The y-axis represents the L2 residual in the image domain. The
images in orange frame are generated samples. Their reconstructed copies are shown on their right. Samples below the dashed
line have reconstruction residuals smaller than 0.01, where no visual difference can be observed. Therefore, the reconstruction
is in general better if there is a higher portion of sample points below the dashed line (a higher successful reconstruction rate).
(a) Reconstruction results when disabling Llpips and Lreg (λ1 = 1.0, λ2 = 0, λ3 = 0). (b) Reconstruction results when disabling
Lreg (λ1 = 1.0, λ2 = 0.2, λ2 = 0). (c) Reconstruction results when enabling all the L2,Llpips and Lreg terms (λ1 = 1.0, λ1 = 0.2,
λ2 = 0.001). We find that using all the terms most benefits the reconstruction.
threshold of 0.01 to the reconstruction error for counting successful
reconstruction rate, and evaluate the success rate for four GAN
models trained on CelebA. Table 5 shows that we obtained more
than 99% success rate for all the GANs, which verifies the feasibility
of our optimization-based attack.
C.1.5 Analysis on Distance Metric Design for Classification. We
propose to enable/disable λ1, λ2, or λ3 in Equation 8 to investigate
the contribution of each term towards classification thresholding
(membership inference) on CelebA. In detail, we consider using (1)
the element-wise difference term L2 only, (2) the deep image feature
term Llpips only, and (3) all the three terms together to evaluate
attack performance. Figure 15 shows the AUCROC of attack against
each various GANs. We find that our complete distance metric
design achieves general superiority to single terms. Therefore, we
use the complete distance metric for classification thresholding.
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Figure 15: White-box attack performance against GANs on
CelebA, w.r.t. distance metric design for classification.
C.2 Additional Quantitative Results
C.2.1 Evaluation on Full Black-box Attack. Attack Performance
w.r.t. Training Set Size: Table 6 corresponds to Figure 5(a), Fig-
ure 5(b), and Figure 5(c) in the main paper.
(a) CelebA
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 20k
PGGAN 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.79 0.58 0.51
WGANGP 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.89 0.72 0.62 0.51
(b) MIMIC-III
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192
WGANGP 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.87 0.81 0.68 0.54 0.52
MEDGAN 0.78 0.65 0.57 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.51
(c) Instagram
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192 10k
WGANGP 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.90 0.72 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.50
Table 6: Full black-box attack performance w.r.t. training set
size.
Attack Performance w.r.t. Training Set Selection: Table 7 cor-
responds to Figure 6 in the main paper.
C.2.2 Evaluation on Partial Black-box Attack. AttackPerformance
w.r.t. Training Set Selection: Table 7 corresponds to Figure 6 in
the main paper.
(a) Full black-box
PGGAN WGANGP DCGAN VAEGAN
random 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.50
identity 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.51
(b) Partial black-box
PGGAN WGANGP DCGAN VAEGAN
random 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.55
identity 0.57 0.60 0.55 0.58
(c) White-box
PGGAN WGANGP DCGAN VAEGAN
random 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.61
identity 0.59 0.59 0.55 0.63
Table 7: Attack performance on the random v.s. identity-
based GAN training set selection. We only focus on CelebA
across attack settings.
C.2.3 Evaluation on White-box Attack. Ablation on Distance
Metric Design for Classification: Table 8 corresponds to Fig-
ure 15.
DCGAN PGGAN WGANGP VAEGAN
L2 0.54 0.59 0.59 0.62
Llpips 0.55 0.58 0.57 0.61
L2 + Llpips + Lreg 0.55 0.59 0.59 0.63
Table 8: White-box attack performance against various
GANs on CelebA, w.r.t. distance metric design for classifica-
tion.
AttackPerformancew.r.t. Training Set Size:Table 9 corresponds
to Figure 5(d), Figure 5(e), and Figure 5(f).
Attack Performance w.r.t. Training Set Selection: Table 7 cor-
responds to Figure 6 in the main paper.
C.2.4 Attack Calibration. Table 10 corresponds to Figure 7 in the
main paper. Table 11 corresponds to Figure 8 in the main paper.
C.2.5 Comparison to Baseline Attacks. Table 12 corresponds to
Figure 9 in the main paper. Table 13 corresponds to Figure 11 in the
main paper. Table 14 corresponds to Figure 10 in the main paper.
(a) CelebA
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 20k
PGGAN 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.83 0.62 0.55
WGANGP 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.89 0.78 0.69 0.53
(b) MIMIC-III
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192
WGANGP 0.98 0.96 0.92 0.87 0.82 0.80 0.67 0.54
MEDGAN 0.99 0.88 0.77 0.72 0.61 0.59 0.55 0.52
(c) Instagram
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192 10k
WGANGP 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.90 0.72 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.49
Table 9: White-box attack performance w.r.t. training set
size.
(a) Full black-box
PGGAN WGANGP DCGAN VAEGAN
before calibration 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.51
after calibration 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.51
(b) Partial black-box
PGGAN WGANGP DCGAN VAEGAN
before calibration 0.57 0.60 0.55 0.58
after calibration 0.58 0.63 0.56 0.59
(c) White-box
PGGAN WGANGP DCGAN VAEGAN
before calibration 0.59 0.59 0.55 0.63
after calibration 0.68 0.64 0.55 0.76
Table 10: Attack performance before and after calibration
on CelebA.
PGGAN WGANGP DCGAN VAEGAN VAE
full bb (LOGAN) 0.56 0.57 0.52 0.50 0.52
full bb (MC) 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.51
full bb (ours calibrated) 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.54
partial bb (ours calibrated) 0.58 0.63 0.56 0.59 0.73
wb (ours calibrated) 0.68 0.66 0.55 0.76 0.94
full (LOGAN/MC) 0.91 0.83 0.83 0.61 0.90
Table 12: Comparison of different attacks on CelebA. bb:
black-box; wb: white-box; full: accessible discriminator (full
model).
(a) MIMIC-III (WGANGP)
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 20k
full bb 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.87 0.81 0.68 0.54 0.52
full bb (calibrated) 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.89 0.84 0.67 0.56
wb 0.98 0.96 0.92 0.87 0.82 0.80 0.67 0.54
wb (calibrated) 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.90 0.87 0.85 0.75 0.59
(b) MIMIC-III (MEDGAN)
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192
full bb 0.78 0.65 0.57 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.51
full bb (calibrated) 0.91 0.71 0.63 0.58 0.55 0.53 0.52 0.51
wb 0.99 0.88 0.77 0.72 0.61 0.59 0.55 0.52
wb (calibrated) 0.96 0.87 0.81 0.75 0.65 0.62 0.57 0.55
(c) Instagram (WGANGP)
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192 10k
full bb 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.90 0.72 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.49
full bb (calibrated) 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.91 0.80 0.72 0.65 0.57 0.56
wb 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.90 0.72 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.49
wb (calibrated) 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.92 0.79 0.73 0.67 0.58 0.57
Table 11: Attack performance before and after calibration
for non-image datasets w.r.t. GAN training set sizes. bb:
black-box; wb: white-box.
(a) MIMIC-III (WGANGP)
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 20k
full bb (LOGAN) 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.83 0.65 0.54
full bb (ours calibrated) 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.89 0.84 0.67 0.56
wb (ours calibrated) 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.90 0.87 0.85 0.75 0.59
dis (LOGAN) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98
(b) MIMIC-III (MEDGAN)
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192
full bb (LOGAN) 0.45 0.57 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.50 0.51
full bb (ours calibrated) 0.91 0.71 0.63 0.58 0.55 0.53 0.52 0.51
wb (calibrated) 0.96 0.87 0.81 0.75 0.65 0.62 0.57 0.55
dis (LOGAN) 1.00 0.92 0.96 0.90 0.85 0.90 0.80 0.73
(c) Instagram (WGANGP)
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192 10k
full bb (LOGAN) 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.91 0.68 0.55 0.58 0.55 0.55
full bb (calibrated) 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.91 0.80 0.72 0.65 0.57 0.56
wb (calibrated) 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.92 0.79 0.73 0.67 0.58 0.57
dis (LOGAN) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.93
Table 13: Comparison of different attacks on the other two
non-image datasets w.r.t. GAN training set size. bb: black-
box; wb: white-box; dis: accessible discriminator.
k 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192 15k 20k 40k 60k 80k 100k
LOGAN 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.57
MC 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.53
ours calibrated 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55 0.55
Table 14: Full black-box attack performance against PGGAN
on CelebA w.r.t. k in Equation 5, the number of generated
samples.
C.2.6 Defense. Table 15 corresponds to Figure 12(a) in the main
paper. Table 16 corresponds to Figure 12(b) in the main paper.
full black-box partial black-box white-box
w/o DP 0.54 0.58 0.68
w/ DP 0.53 0.56 0.59
Table 15: Attack performance against PGGAN on CelebA
with or without DP defense.
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096
white-box w/o DP 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.83 0.62
white-box w/ DP 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.90 0.70 0.56
full black-box w/o DP 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.79 0.57
full black-box w/ DP 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.89 0.68 0.53
Table 16: Attack performance against PGGAN on CelebA
with or without DP defense, w.r.t. GAN training set size.
C.3 Additional Qualitative Results
Given query samplesx , we show their reconstruction copiesR(x |Gv )
and R(x |Gr ) obtained in our white-box attack.
(a) Query (real) images
(b) PGGAN victim model reconstruction
(c) PGGAN (w/ DP) victim model reconstruction
(d) PGGAN reference model reconstruction
(e) WGANGP victim model reconstruction
(f) WGANGP reference model reconstruction
(g) DCGAN victim model reconstruction
(h) DCGAN reference model reconstruction
(i) VAEGAN victim model reconstruction
(j) VAEGAN reference model reconstruction
Figure 16: Reconstruction of query samples x that are in the training set, i.e., x ∈ Dtrain.
(a) Query (real) images
(b) PGGAN victim model reconstruction
(c) PGGAN (w/ DP) victim model reconstruction
(d) PGGAN reference model reconstruction
(e) WGANGP victim model reconstruction
(f) WGANGP reference model reconstruction
(g) DCGAN victim model reconstruction
(h) DCGAN reference model reconstruction
(i) VAEGAN victim model reconstruction
(j) VAEGAN reference model reconstruction
Figure 17: Reconstruction of query samples x that are not in the training set, i.e., x < Dtrain.
